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Abstract
Random matching models with diﬀerent states are an important class of dynamic
games; for example, money search models, job search models, and some games in
biology are special cases. In this paper, we investigate the basic structure of the
models: the existence of equilibria, the global structure of the set of equilibria, and the
approximation and computation of equilibria. Under conditions which are typically
satisﬁed in monetary models, the equilibrium condition can be considered as a non-
linear complementarity problem with some new feature.
Keywords: Random Matching Model, Money, Stationary Equilibria, Non-linear
Comlementarity Problem.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we study the basic structure of random matching models with a ﬁnite number
of states and a continuum of agents. Random matching models are an important class of
dynamic games; for example, money search models, job search models, and some games in
biology are special cases. In the models, each matched pair of agents play a game of which
action spaces and payoﬀs depend on their states. The states follow a Markov process, i.e.,
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1the probability distribution on states in the next period is determined by the current states
and actions.
In spite of its importance, the structure of random matching models has not been fully
explored in the literature. For example, no existence theorem in a general framework has
been known. In this paper, we investigate the basic structure of the model: the existence of
equilibria, the global structure of the set of equilibria, and the approximation and computa-
tion of equilibria.
The existence of equilibria is one of the most important questions in any economic model.
In some speciﬁc random matching models, the existence of equilibria has been proved by
directly calculating equilibria. (See, for example, Green and Zhou (1998) and Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989).) However, to the best of our knowledge, no general existence theorem has
been proved in the literature. In this paper, ﬁrst we present an existence theorem in a general
framework. The existence theorems in stochastic games, e.g., Duﬃe et al. (1994), cannot
be applied to random matching models, since the number of players is typically ﬁnite in
stochastic games.
Second, assuming some condition that is typically satisﬁed in random matching models
with money, we show some remarkable features about the set of (monetary) equilibria. More
precisely, under that condition, the set of equilibria is at least one-dimensional, and adding
some transversality condition, it is a one-dimensional manifold with endpoints in which all
agents are at the same state. Moreover, under these conditions, the equilibrium condition
can be considered as a non-linear complementarity problem h a v i n go n ed e g r e eo ff r e e d o m
and with a new feature. The equilibrium condition can be written as follows:
fn(x,y)=0 ,n =1 ,2,...,N,
ymgm(x,y)=0 ,m =1 ,2,...,M,
xn ≥ 0,n =1 ,2,...,N,
gm(x,y) ≥ 0,y m ≥ 0,m =1 ,2,...,M.
The ﬁrst system, the condition for stationary probability distribution, has one redundant
equation and seems to be a standard system of equations, while the second and the fourth
system, the condition for dynamic optimization, look as a standard complementarity prob-
lem. However, because of the random matching structure, the whole system can be seen as a
complementarity problem. Suppose some xn becomes zero when we follow a one-dimensional
set of equilibria. Then, by the random matching structure, fn(x,y) = 0 becomes an identity
and precisely one positive ym simultaneously becomes zero, and thus we can follow the set
of equilibria further by setting xn =0a n dym =0a n dr e l a x i n ggm(x,y) ≥ 0. In this way
a connected component of equilibria can be obtained by ﬁnding an endpoint and following
the one-dimensional manifold by some simplicial or predictor-corrector algorithm. (See, for
example Allgower and Georg (1990).)
We also consider the case that the transversality condition does not necessarily hold.
2In this case, a higher dimensional set of equilibria may exist. We present a method to
follow the set of equilibria approximately by perturbing the system. As is well known, some
perturbation of a system of equations can make the system regular. For example, adding
constant terms to the system, the regularity directly follows from Sard theorem. However,
in our case, such perturbation does not work and some sophisticated perturbation is needed.
By the perturbation, the set of approximated equilibria becomes a one-dimensional manifold
and one of its connected components can be followed by ﬁnding an endpoint and using some
path-following algorithm.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model and present
an existence theorem. In Section 3, we present an example of the random matching model
with money, a special case of the basic model. In Section 4, assuming some transversality
condition and some special condition, being typically satisﬁed in monetary model, we com-
pletely characterize the global structure of the set of equilibria. Finally, in Section 5, we
consider the case that the transversality condition is not satisﬁed and approximate the set
of equilibria by perturbing the system.
2 The Basic Model and the Existence of Stationary
Markov Perfect Equilibria
Time is discrete starting from 0. There are a ﬁnite number of states denoted by n =
0,1,...,N.L e t N = {0,1,...,N} denote the set of states. We assume that there are
inﬁnitely lived agents with a nonatomic mass of measure one. A probability measure on N is
denoted by a vector vector h =( h(0),h(1),...,h(N)) with all h(n) ≥ 0a n d
PN
n=0 h(n)=1 ,
where h(n) is the proportion of agents at state n.
A na g e n ta ts t a t en c h o o s e sa na c t i o ni nt h es e tAn = {an
1,...,a n
kn}.T h e n u m b e r
K =
PN
n=0 kn denotes the total number of actions. Let βnj ≥ 0 satisfying
Pkn
j=1 βnj =1
be the proportion of the agents choosing action an
j among the agents at state n,a n dl e t
β =( β01,...,βnj,...,βNkN). The number h(n,j)=βnjh(n) will denote the proportion of
agents choosing action an
j.
At each time period, ordered pairs of agents are matched. Suppose an (n,j)a g e n t ,w h o
is at state n and chooses action an
j,i sm a t c h e dt oa n( n0,j0) agent, who is at state n0 and
chooses action an0
j0. Then in the next period the ﬁrst agent’s and the second agent’s states
will be f1((n,j),(n0,j0)) and f2((n,j),(n0,j0)), respectively. That is both f1 and f2 map an
ordered pair ((n,j),(n0,j0)) to elements in N.
Example 1 When one agent chooses an action and the other agent chooses an action after
observing the ﬁrst agent’s action, we may order the pair ((n,j),(n0,j0)) in such a way that
the (n,j) agent chooses ﬁrst and the (n0,j0) chooses second.





0),(n,j)) for all (n,j) and (n
0,j
0).
In these models there is no ordering in the pair of agents being matched.
We assume a random matching structure; the proportion of matching between agents with
(n,j)a n d( n0,j0)i se q u a lt oµh(n,j)h(n0,j0), where µ ∈ (0,1] is exogenously given, and with
probability 1
2 one of the two agents becomes the ﬁrst agent and the other one becomes the sec-
ond agent in the ordering. Therefore, in each period a proportion 1
2µh(n,j)h(n0,j0)o fa g e n t s
move from state n to state f1((n,j),(n0,j0)) and from state n0 to state f2((n,j),(n0,j0)).
Let u1((n,j),(n0,j0)) and u2((n,j),(n0,j0)) be the one-period utilities of an (n,j)a g e n t
and an (n0,j0) agent, respectively, when the ﬁrst agent is matched to the second agent. Let
α ∈ IR + be the discount factor and let γ ∈ IR
L be the vector of parameters of the model
including α and µ.
We adopt a Bellman equation approach. Let V (n)b et h ev a l u eo fs t a t en, n =0 ,1,...,N,
















Then the value of action an





































the probability of state n0 in the next period conditional on ((n,j),h,β). We will deﬁne
stationary Markov perfect equilibria in our framework. First, by dynamic optimization, the
following conditions should be satisﬁed:
1.
Pkn
j=1 βnj =1 ,n =0 ,1,...,N,
42. V (n)=m a x j Wnj(x;γ),n =0 ,1,...,N,
3. βnj ≥ 0f o ra l l( n,j), and βnj0 > 0i m p l i e sj0 ∈ argmaxj Wnj(x;γ),n =0 ,1,...,N.
The second condition is the Bellman equation and the third condition means that only the
best responses are used in an equilibrium. The above conditions are equivalent to:
βnj ≥ 0,j=1 ,...,k n,
kn X
j=1
βnj − 1=0 ,n =0 ,1,...,N,
V (n) − Wnj(x;γ)=0 , if βnj > 0,n=0 ,1,...,N,
V (n) − Wnj(x;γ) ≥ 0, if βnj =0 ,n=0 ,1,...,N.
Indeed, since
Pkn
j=1 βnj − 1=0 ,t h e r ee x i s t saj0 such that βnj0 > 0a n dt h u sf o ra l ls u c hj0
it holds that V (n)=Wnj0(x;γ)a n dWnj0(x;γ) ≥ Wnj(x;γ) for all j.T h i si m p l i e st h ea b o v e
three conditions. The converse clearly holds.























Note that “gross” means that the cases of f1 = n and f2 = n a r ei n c l u d e di nt h ed e ﬁnition.
















is an identity and thus O0(h,β;γ)=I0(h,β;γ) is redundant.
5Deﬁnition 1 The tuple x∗ =( V ∗,h ∗,β∗),w i t hh∗(n) ≥ 0 for n =0 ,1,...,N,a n dβ∗
nj ≥ 0














nj − 1=0 ,n =0 ,1,...,N,
V
∗(n) − Wnj(x





∗;γ) ≥ 0, if β
∗
nj =0 .
Below, we present an existence theorem under the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For the discount factor α it holds that α ∈ (0,1).
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof:
For given γ, V (n), n =0 ,1,...,N, can be expressed as functions of (h,β)b ys o l v i n gt h e













Clearly, by Assumption 1 the system is regular. Thus these functions are continuous func-
tions of (h,β) and will be denoted by ˜ Vn(h,β;γ), n =0 ,1,...,N.1 Also Wnj(x;γ)c a nb ee x -
pressed as a continuous function of (h,β), to be denoted by ˜ Wnj(h,β;γ),n=0 ,1,...,N,j=
1,...,k n.
























i xi =1 } and em is the m-vector of ones.
Since the domain of g is a non-empty, convex, compact set and g itself is a continuous
function of (h,β), there exists a stationary point (h∗,β∗)o fg, i.e.,





n(h∗,β∗), for all βn ∈ Skn,n=0 ,1,...,N.
1Note that, since α ∈ (0,1), ˜ Vn(h,β;γ),n =0 ,1,...,N, can be obtained by iteratively substituting
V (n),n=0 ,1,...,N,i nt h ea b o v es y s t e m .
6Take d(t)=( 1− t)h∗ +te(n), where e(n)d e n o t e sa nn-th unit vector of appropriate length.










If h∗(n)=0t h e nd(t) ∈ SN+1 for small positive t. Hence, since In(h∗,β∗;γ)) ≥ 0=













n(h∗,β∗)=0 ,w eo b t a i ng1
n(h∗,β∗)=0f o ra l ln =0 ,1,...,N,a n ds o
On(h∗,β∗;γ)=In(h∗,β∗;γ)f o ra l ln =0 ,1,...,N.
Next take d(t)=( 1− t)β∗
n + te(j). If β∗
nj > 0, then d(t) ∈ Skn for any t close to zero.
Hence, if β∗





















nj =0 ,t h e nd(t) ∈ Skn for small positive t.H e n c e ,i fβ∗






























The theorem states that if the discount factor α lies between 0 and 1, there exists at least
one stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Now we investigate the case that, for each matched pair, the sum of their states does not
c h a n g e .T h a ti sw ea s s u m et h ef o l l o w i n g .





0)) = n + n
0.
This assumption is satisﬁed in random matching models with money. In such models, n
stands for the amount of money an agent has, i.e. any agent at state n has n units of money.
For a matched pair ((n,j),(n0,j0)), an (n,j) agent is a (potential) seller and an (n0,j0)a g e n t
is a (potential) buyer, and a possible transaction is made using money. Since the amount
of money the seller pays is the same as the buyer gets, the total amount of money does not
change. For details, see the next sections and Green and Zhou (1988), Kamiya and Shimizu
(2002), and Zhou (1999).
In this case, the following lemma holds.2








Consider an ordered pair ((n,j),(n0,j0)). By the matchings between them, a proportion
1
2µh(n,j)h(n0,j0)o fa g e n t sm o v ef r o mn to f1((n,j),(n0,j0)), and the same proportion moves
from n0 to f2((n,j),(n0,j0)). Corresponding to the moves, the following terms appear in the
left hand side (LHS) and in the right hand side (RHS) of (1):







Because of Assumption 2 the sum of the terms in the LHS is equal to the one in the RHS.
Since this holds for every pair ((n,j),(n0,j0)), formula (1) holds.
From the lemma it follows that
N X
n=0
n(On(h,β;γ) − In(h,β;γ)) = 0. (2)
Since also
PN
n=0(On(h,β;γ) − In(h,β;γ)) = 0, without loss of generality, we can ﬁrst delete
O0(h,β;γ) − I0(h,β;γ)=0a n dt h e n ,b y( 2 ) ,w ec a nd e l e t eO1(h,β;γ) − I1(h,β;γ)=0 .
Thus the distribution h is stationary if and only if On(h,β;γ)−In(h,β;γ)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N,
2Kamiya and Shimizu (2002) presented a similar theorem.
8and
PN
n=0 h(n) − 1 = 0 hold. This means that the tuple x∗ =( V ∗,h ∗,β∗)i sas t a t i o n a r y














nj − 1=0 ,n =0 ,1,...,N,
V
∗(n) − Wnj(x





∗;γ) ≥ 0, if β
∗
nj =0 .
Suppose the inequalities are strict and for n, n =0 ,...,N,l e tA∗
n be the set of actions at
state n being chosen in the equilibrium with positive probability. Then the total number of
variables, V (n), h(n), and βnj,j∈ A∗




and the number of equalities is (N − 1) + 1 + (N +1 )+
PN
n=0 #A∗
n. Thus the dimension
of the set of equilibria is typically at least equal to one. Moreover, if some transversality
conditions are satisﬁed, the dimension is equal to one. In Section 4, we show this rigorously.
3A n Example
In this section, we present a discrete time version of Zhou (1999)’s model with an exogenously
given upper bound of money holdings and we completely characterize some of the sets of
stationary Markov perfect equilibria.
3.1 A discrete time version of Zhou’s model
There are k ≥ 3 types of agents with equal fraction and the same number of types of goods.
Only one unit of good i can be produced and held by a type i − 1( m o d . k)a g e n t . T h e
production cost is c>0. A type i agent obtains utility u>0 only when she consumes one
unit of good i.I f a t y p e i − 1a g e n ti sm a t c h e dt oat y p ei agent, then the ﬁrst agent is
a (potential) seller and the second agent is a (potential) buyer. The ﬁrst agent refuses to
trade or posts a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer and the second agent can accept the oﬀer or
not. For example, when k = 3 a type 1 agent produces one unit of good 2 being desired by
a type 2 agent, a type 2 agent produces one unit of good 3 being desired by a type 3 agent,
and a type 3 agent produces one unit of good 1 being desired by a type 1 agent. Moreover,
if a type 1 agent meets a type 2 agent, then the former becomes a (potential) seller and the
latter one a (potential) buyer. Similar arguments apply to the cases of a matching of a type
2 agent and a type 3 agent, and of a matching of a type 3 agent and a type 1 agent.
9Fiat money is assumed to be divisible. We conﬁne our attention to the case that, for
ag i v e np>0, the support of money holding distribution is {0,p,2p,...,Np},w h e r eN is
exogenously given. The number p is determined by
PN
n=0 pnh(n)=M,w h e r eM>0i sa n
exogenously given supply of money. Thus, without abuse of notation, a distribution h on N
is identiﬁed with a distribution on {0,p,2p,...,Np}. We will focus on symmetric stationary
Markov perfect equilibria for which the strategies that agents with an identical money holding
take are time-invariant and type-invariant. Therefore, we will hereafter discuss a generic type
i. A strategy of an agent (of any type) is deﬁned as a set of two correspondences, an oﬀer
strategy ω : N → N ∪ {NT} and a reservation price strategy ρ : N → N, where NT stands
for no trade. For n ∈ N, ω(n)i sas e to fp r i c e sa n d / o rn ot r a d et h a ta na g e n tw i t hm o n e y
holding np oﬀers when she is a (potential) seller. More precisely, if o ∈ ω(n)a n do 6=N T ,
then op is an oﬀer price, and if o ∈ ω(n)a n do =N T , then she does not sell, no matter what
the buyer’s reservation price is. A seller with money holding n oﬀe r so n eo ft h ee l e m e n t si n
ω(n). Since for any agent his money holding cannot exceed the amount N,t h eo ﬀer price
is at most equal to (N − n)p.F o r n ∈ N, r ∈ ρ(n) is a reservation price, below which
oﬀers are accepted and above which they are rejected. In fact, we will show that, by the
perfectness condition, ρ(n) gives the maximum price that a buyer is willing to defray for the
consumption good, and so ρ becomes a function rather than a correspondence. Since the
reservation price of a buyer cannot exceed her money holdings, ρ should satisfy the following
feasibility condition:
ρ(n) ≤ n, n =0 ,1,...,N. (3)
For a money holding np,a no ﬀer price op, and a reservation price rp, H(n,o,r)d e n o t e sa
stationary distribution deﬁned on N×(N ∪{NT})×N.F r o mH, the stationary distribution
of oﬀer prices, Ω, and the stationary distribution of reservation prices, R,a r eg i v e nb y
Ω(x)=H({(n,o,r)|o 6=N T ,o≤ x})( 4 )
R(x)=H({(n,o,r)|r<x }). (5)
Let V : N → I R be the value function. That is, V (n) is the maximum value of discounted
utility achievable by the agent’s current money holding np. At every moment, a type i agent
with money holding np i sa( p o t e n t i a l )b u y e rw h e nm e e t i n gat y p ei−1 agent, which occurs
with probability 1/k. Transaction does not occur and money holding does not change if the
s e l l e rc h o o s e sN To rh e ro ﬀer op exceeds the type i’s reservation price rp. If the partner’s
oﬀer price op is not more than reservation price rp, then transaction occurs and the type i
agent derives utility u from consumption and enters in the next trading opportunity with
money holding (n − o)p. The probability that type i with money holding np is a seller and
meets a type i +1a g e n ti sa l s o1 /k. Transaction does not occur if the type i chooses NT
or her oﬀer op is greater than the partner’s reservation price rp.I ft y p ei’s oﬀer op does not
10exceed rp, then transaction occurs and she faces the next matching opportunity with money





















)αV (n),n=0 ,1,...,N, (6)
where Ω(−1) = 0. Thus
V (n)=
1











R(o)αV (n)+( 1− R(o))(−c + αV (n + o))
¾¶
,
n =0 ,1,...,N. (7)
In terms of V (n), it is optimal for a buyer to accept oﬀer op if u + αV (n − o) ≥ αV (n).




¯ ¯u + αV (n − r) ≥ αV (n)
ª
. (8)
That is, agent of type i’s reservation price is her full value for good i, and thus it is a function
of n.
From the above, the action space and the matching technology can be written as follows:
• An = {an
(o,r)|o =0 ,1,...,N − n,NT, and r =0 ,1,...,n}.A n a c t i o n an
(o,r) means
that an agent with n oﬀers op or no trade NT when she is a seller, and she accepts the
partner’s oﬀer only if the oﬀer price is less than or equal to rp when she is a buyer.













n0 − o if o 6=N T ,a n do ≤ r0
n0 otherwise.
• The proportion of matching between agents with (n,j)a n d( n0,j0)i se q u a lt o2
kh(n,j)h(n0,j0),
and with probability 1
2 one of the two agents becomes the ﬁrst agent and the other one
becomes the second agent.
113.2 The Case of N =1
We completely characterize the set of equilibria in the case of N =1 ,k =3 ,u = 15
4 ,c= 3
4,
and α = 3
4. Note that in what follows an agent with np units of money is called an agent
with n. The set of equilibria consists of the following two pieces (see Figure 1):
1. The strategy of the ﬁrst piece is
• agents with 0 oﬀer p and agents with 1 accept any price less than or equal to p.
Thus the conditions for a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium are
h(0) + h(1) − 1=0




























































h(1)V (1) − V (1) ≥ 0,
where the last two inequalities are the incentive constraints for agents with 0 and with
1, respectively. From the ﬁrst three equations in the above system, V (0) and V (1) can
be solved as a function of h(0) as follows:













At h(0) = 1, all incentives are satisﬁed. When h(0) is decreased, the incentive of
agents without money becomes binding ﬁrst at h(0) = 1








4h(0)V (0) = V (0) holds for h(0) = 1
4.
2. The strategy of the second piece is
• agents with 0 are indiﬀerent between oﬀering p and NT, i.e., a proportion a ∈ [0,1]
of agents with 0 oﬀers p and a proportion 1 − a c h o o s e sN T ,a n da g e n t sw i t h1
accept any oﬀer less than or equal to p.
12Thus the conditions for a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium are
h(0) + h(1) − 1=0
































h(0)V (0) = 0





























h(1)V (1) − V (1) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality is the incentive constraint for the agents with 1. From the
ﬁr s tf o u re q u a t i o n si nt h ea b o v es y s t e m ,V (0), V (1), and a c a nb es o l v e da saf u n c t i o n
of h(0) as follows:




At h(0) = 1
4, the endpoint of the ﬁrst piece, all incentive constraints for the agents
with 0 are satisﬁed. When h(0) is increased, all incentive constraints for the agents
with 0 remain satisﬁed until h(0) = 1. That is the solution path reaches an endpoint.
In this example the set of stationary Markov perfect equilibria consists of one one-
dimensional manifold and both endpoints satisfy h(0) = 1.
3.3 The Case of N =2
Next, we consider the case N =2 ,k =3 ,u = 15
4 ,c= 3
4,a n dα = 3
4. In this case, there are
two connected components of solutions, but we only investigate one of them. The connected
set consists of six pieces as follows. The other component looks quite similar. For simplicity,
we do not present the Bellman equations.
The ﬁrst piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p,a g e n t sw i t h1o ﬀer p and their reservation price
is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the starting point: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (1,0,0).
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.62321,0.26452,0.11227).
13• at the endpoint, agents with 1 become indiﬀerent between oﬀering p and NT.
The second piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p, agents with 1 are indiﬀerent between oﬀering p
and NT and their reservation price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is
2p.
• the starting point: the endpoint of the ﬁrst piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.84307,0.15693,0).
• at the endpoint, h(2) becomes 0 and the proportion of agents with 1 oﬀering 1 becomes
0.
The third piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p, agents with 1 choose NT and their reservation
price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the starting point: the endpoint of the second piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.25,0.75,0).
• at the endpoint, agents with 0 become indiﬀerent between oﬀe r i n g1 ,2 ,a n dN T .
At the endpoint of the third piece, we should analyze the case that three actions are used.
However, we ﬁrst analyze the case that agents with 0 oﬀer p or 2p.
The forth piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p or 2p, agents with 1 choose NT and their reservation
price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the starting point: the endpoint of the third piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.58333,0.41667,0).
• at the endpoint, agents with 1 become indiﬀerent between oﬀering p and NT.
14Next, we investigate the general case at the endpoint of the third piece. There exists the
following two-dimensional solution set.
Piece A:
• the strategies: agents with 0 choose p,2 p, or NT, agents with 1 choose NT and their
reservation price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the piece has four extreme points: two endpoints of the fourth piece, one extreme point
at h =( 1 ,0,0), where the proportions of oﬀering p and 2p are 1
4 and 0, respectively,
and an other extreme point at h =( 1 ,0,0), where the proportions of oﬀering p and 2p
are 1
4 and 1
3, respectively. (See Figure 2.)
Remark 1 In piece A, although there are three best actions for agents with 0, one indiﬀer-
















However, by h(2) = 0 and h(0) + h(1) + h(2) = 1, the above equation is in fact an identity.
Thus there are two free variables in the system of equations and the dimension of the set of
equilibria is two.
The ﬁfth piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p or 2p,a g e n t sw i t h1o ﬀer p or NT and their
reservation price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the starting point: the endpoint of the forth piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.61193,0.23247,0.15226).
• at the endpoint, the proportion of agents with 1 choosing NT becomes 0.
The sixth piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p or 2p,a g e n t sw i t h1o ﬀer p and their reservation
price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the starting point: the endpoint of the ﬁfth piece.
15• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (1,0,0).
• at the endpoint, the path has returned to h(0) = 1.
In this example the connected sets of stationary Markov perfect equilibria are not one-
dimensional. We showed the existence of a two-dimensional piece on one of the sets of
equilibria. However, if certain transversality conditions are satisﬁed, the dimension of each
piece is one, as we will show in the next section.
4 The Random Matching Model with Conservation Law
In this section we discuss conditions under which the dimension of stationary Markov per-
fect equilibria is equal to one. Let B denote the power set of {(n,j) | j =1 ,...,k n,n =
0,1,...,N} and let ˆ B = {b ∈ B |∀n,∃(n,j) ∈ b}.A ne l e m e n tb ∈ ˆ B c a nb ec o n s i d e r e dt o
be a set of actions potentially used in an equilibrium. For given b ∈ ˆ B,l e t
Ω
b = {(βnj)(n,j)∈b | βnj > 0f o r a l l ( n,j) ∈ b}.
Let xb =( V,h,βb), for some βb ∈ Ωb.F o rg i v e nb ∈ ˆ B and (n,j) ∈ b, W b
nj(xb;γ)i sd e ﬁned
from Wnj(x;γ)b ys e t t i n gβn0j0 =0f o ra l l( n0,j0) / ∈ b. In parallel with this, Ib
n(h,βb;γ)a n d
Ob
n(h,βb;γ)a r ed e ﬁned.
Let
Γ = {(b,J) ∈ ˆ B × 2N | h(n)=0 ,n/ ∈ J, and h(n) > 0,n ∈ J,
imply Ib
n(h,βb;γ)=0f o ra l ln/ ∈ J,βb ∈ Ωb}.
Note that if Ib
n(h,βb;γ)=0f o rs o m e( h,βb) such that h(n) > 0f o rn ∈ J and h(n)=0f o r
n/ ∈ J, then by the random matching structure Ib
n(h,βb;γ)=0h o l d sf o ra l l( h,βb) such that
h(n) > 0f o rn ∈ J and h(n)=0f o rn/ ∈ J. Notice that every stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium corresponds to some (b,J) ∈ Γ and therefore we only need to consider elements
in Γ.F o re v e r y( b,J) ∈ Γ it holds that Ob
n − Ib
n =0 ,n/ ∈ J, is an identity. Therefore, these
identities can be deleted from the system of equations. Note that if J = {n0}, i.e., a singleton,
then
PN
n=0 h(n) − 1 = 0 can also be deleted. Let J = {j1,...,j m},w h e r ej1 < ···<j m.





      
      
Ob
n(h,βb;γ) − Ib
n(h,βb;γ) n ∈ J \{ j1,j 2},
PN
n=0 h(n) − 1i f # J 6=1
P
{j|(n,j)∈b} βb
nj − 1 n =0 ,1,...,N,
V (n) − W b
nj(xb;γ)( n,j) ∈ b,
V (n) − W b
nj(xb;γ)( n,j) / ∈ b,





b | h(n) > 0,n∈ J,h(n)=0 ,n / ∈ J,g
(b,J)(x
b;γ) ∈ {0}×···×{ 0}
| {z }
N+m+#b
×IR + ×···×IR + | {z }
K−#b
},
be the set of stationary Markov perfect equilibria for given (b,J) ∈ Γ. Moreover, for (b,J) ∈
Γ,l e t
C
(b,J) = {0}×···×{ 0}
| {z }
N+m+#b
×IR ++ ×···×IR ++ | {z }
K−#b
,
and, for (n,j) / ∈ b,
C
(b,J),(n,j) = {0}×···×{ 0}
| {z }
N+m+#b
×IR ++ ×···×IR ++ ×{ 0}×IR ++ ×···×IR ++ | {z }
K−#b
,
where the last {0} corresponds to the component V (n)−W b
nj(xb;γ). Moreover, for (n,j),(n0,j0) / ∈
b such that (n,j) 6=( n0,j0), let
C
(b,J),(n,j),(n0,j0) = {0}×···×{ 0}
| {z }
N+m+#b




where the last two {0}s correspond to the components V (n) − W b
nj(xb;γ)a n dV (n0) −
W b
n0j0(xb;γ).
Assumption 3 For every (b,J) ∈ Γ, g(b,J), with domain restricted to h(n) > 0 for n ∈ J
and h(n)=0for n/ ∈ J when #J>1 and to h(¯ n)=1and h(n)=0for n/ ∈ J when
J = {¯ n}, transversely intersects C(b,J), C(b,J),(n,j), C(b,J),(n,j),(n0,j0) for all (n,j),(n0,j0) / ∈ b
such that (n,j) 6=( n0,j0).
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, each connected component of the set of sta-
tionary Markov perfect equilibria is homeomorphic either to a circle or to the unit interval
[0,1]. Moreover, the two endpoints of a component, if they exist, are at h(n)=1a n d
h(n0)=1f o rs o m en and n0.
Intuitively, for given (b,J) ∈ Γ such that #J 6= 1, the system for stationary Markov
perfect equilibria contains N + m +# b equations and N + m +1+# b variables. Thus,
under the transversality condition, the set of equilibria is a one-dimensional manifold. At
the endpoints, one of the following four cases may occur:
17• βnj =0f o rs o m e( n,j) ∈ b;
• V (n) − W b
nj(xb;γ)=0f o rs o m e( n,j) / ∈ b;
• h(¯ n)=0f o rs o m e¯ n ∈ J and h(n) < 1f o ra l ln ∈ J;
• h(n)=1f o rs o m en ∈ J.
In the ﬁrst three cases, the next lemma implies that the endpoint is also an endpoint of
precisely one other connected component of some E
(b0,J0)
γ . On the other hand, if |J| =1 ,
the system for stationary Markov perfect equilibria contains N + m +# b equations and
N + m +# b variables. Thus generically the equilibria are determinate. Because of this,
the paths in E
(b,J)
γ c a nb el i n k e df o rd i ﬀerent (b,J)i nΓ to form loops and paths with two
diﬀerent endpoints in the spaces h(n)=1a n dh(n0)=1f o rs o m en and n0.
First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if a connected component of E
(b,J)
γ for a given
(b,J) ∈ Γ has an endpoint in the space of h(¯ n)=0f o rs o m e¯ n ∈ J and h(n)d o e sn o t
become equal to 1 for some n ∈ J,t h e ns o m eβn0j0,(n0,j0) ∈ b, becomes zero at the endpoint.
Moreover, this βn0j0 is unique.
Proof:
Let J0 be the subset of J for which h(i), i ∈ J0, becomes zero at the endpoint. Since h(n)
does not become equal to 1 for some n ∈ J, the endpoint is a solution of the system deleting
the variables h(i), i ∈ J0 ∪ Jc,a n dt h ee q u a t i o n sOb
i − Ib
i =0 ,i∈ J0 ∪ Jc.3 Consider the set
of solutions in the space of h(i) > 0, i ∈ J,h(i)=0 ,i / ∈ J. At the endpoint of the set of
solutions, all terms in Ib
i,i∈ J0, become zero, since Ob
i,i∈ J0, become zero. There are two
cases:
1 .F o ra tl e a s to n et e r m1
2βn0j0h(n0)βn00j00h(n00)i nIb
i such that i ∈ J0, either βn0j0 or βn00j00
becomes zero. As in Kamiya and Shimizu (2002), because of Assumption 3, only one
incentive constraint becomes binding in the space of h(i) > 0,i∈ J \ J0,h(i)=0 ,i∈
J0 ∪ Jc, and thus only one of them included in such terms can be zero.
2. For all terms 1
2βn0j0h(n0)βn00j00h(n00)i nIb
i such that i ∈ J0, at least one of n0 and n00 is
in J0,a n dβn0j0 and βn00j00 remain positive.
In the ﬁrst case, the lemma holds. In the second case, all of such terms 1
2βn0j0h(n0)βn00j00h(n00)
are included in at least one Ob






i = 0 is an identity in the
space of h(i) > 0, i ∈ J. This contradicts Assumption 3 so that the second case does not
occur.
3Jc denotes the complement of J.
18Lemma 2 shows the new feature in the complementarity problem with respect to the
variables h and β.I fa ta ne n d p o i n ts o m eh(n) becomes zero, then In − On = 0 becomes an
identity and simultaneously βn0j0 b e c o m e s0f o rs o m eu n i q u e( n0,j0).
Proof of Theorem 2: For given (b,J) ∈ Γ, E
(b,J)
γ is a one-dimensional manifold because of
the assumptions. (See Kamiya and Shimizu (2002).) Therefore it consists of loops and paths
with two endpoints. From Lemma 2 and the assumptions it follows that at each endpoint,
exactly one of the following possibilities occurs:
• βnj =0f o rp r e c i s e l yo n e( n,j) ∈ b and h(n0) > 0 for all n0 ∈ J;
• V (n) − W b
nj(xb;γ) = 0 for precisely one (n,j) / ∈ b;
• h(¯ n)=0f o rs o m e¯ n ∈ J and βnj =0f o rp r e c i s e l yo n e( n,j) ∈ b;
• h(n)=1f o rs o m en ∈ J.
In the ﬁrst case, the endpoint is also an endpoint of a unique path in E
(b0,J)
γ ,w h e r eb0 =
b \{ (n,j)}. In the second case, the endpoint is also an endpoint of a unique path in E
(b0,J)
γ ,
where b0 = b ∪ {(n,j)}. In the third case, the endpoint is also an endpoint of a unique path
in E
(b0,J0)
γ ,w h e r eb0 = b \{ (n,j)} and J0 = J \{ ¯ n ∈ J|h(¯ n)=0 }.I n t h e f o u r t h c a s e , w e
can delete all equations On − In =0 ,n ∈ J,a n d
P
n h(n) − 1 = 0, so that the system has
the same number of equations as number of variables. Therefore, from the assumptions, it
follows that the endpoint is not an endpoint of any other path in some E
(b0,J0)
γ . Because of
this, the paths in E
(b,J)
γ c a nb el i n k e df o rd i ﬀerent (b,J) ∈ Γ to form loops and paths with
two diﬀerent endpoints in the spaces h(n)=1a n dh(n0)=1f o rs o m en and n0.
In random matching models with money, h(n)=1f o rs o m en 6=0t y p i c a l l yd o e sn o t
hold in monetary equilibria. In such models, a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is a
monetary equilibrium if f1((n,j),(n0,j0)) 6= n holds for some (n,j),(n0,j0) ∈ b,w h e r eb is
the set of actions in the equilibrium. For more details, see Green and Zhou (1998), Kamiya
and Shimizu (2002), and Zhou (1999). Thus, under Assumption 3, the global structure of
the set of equilibria is described as in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 3 holds and h(n)=1f o rs o m en 6= 0 does not hold in
any stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. Then each connected component of the set of
stationary Markov perfect equilibria is homeomorphic to either a circle or to [0,1]. Moreover,
the two endpoints of a component, if they exist, are at h(0) = 1.
Since, in random matching models with money, at h(0) = 1, the Bellman equation is
typically quite simple, it is often easy to compute an equilibrium in the space of h(0) = 1.
19Then following the set of equilibria starting at this equilibrium by some path-following
method, we eventually reach another equilibrium with h(0) = 1. In this way, we can generate
a continuum of equilibria of random matching models with conservation law.
5 Approximation of the Set of Equilibria
In this section we consider the case that Assumption 3 does not necessarily hold. When
Assumption 3 holds, every connected set of equilibria is one-dimensional and in case it is not
al o o pi tc a nb ef o l l o w e df r o mo n ee n d p o i n ta th(n)=1f o rs o m en to the other endpoint
at h(n0)=1f o rs o m en0. However, as the forth piece in the example in the previous section
shows, a higher-dimensional piece may exist if Assumption 3 is not satisﬁed. Below, we
present a method to follow the set of equilibria approximately by perturbing the system. As
is well known, certain perturbations of a system of equations can make the system regular.
For example, adding constant terms to the system, regularity may directly follow from Sard
theorem. However, in our case, such perturbation does not work; in the set of approximated
equilibria, the endpoints may not be at h(0) = 1 and it may not be the case that some βn0j0
becomes zero when h(n) becomes zero.
5.1 The Perturbation Method
In this subsection, we assume the structure of monetary economies. Let
B






the set of actions that are candidates for monetary equilibria, i.e., transactions potentially
occur for b ∈ B∗. First, we assume the following as in the examples of Section 3.
Assumption 4 For all b ∈ B∗, h(n)=1for some n 6=0does not hold in any stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium xb.
For simplicity, we also assume that if no transaction is made, then for every agent the
value is equal to zero.
Assumption 5 In stationary Markov perfect equilibria, V (n)=0 , n =0 ,1,...,N,i fb/ ∈
B∗.
The above assumptions are satisﬁed in the example in Subsection 3.1 if the cost parameter
c is small enough.




First, Assumption 5 clearly holds. Suppose x∗ is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
such that ∃¯ n 6=0 ,h(¯ n)=1 .L e tb∗ be the set of indices (n,j)u s e di nx∗. Recall that j can
be denoted by (on,r n), where on is an oﬀer price and rn is a reservation price. Then
f1((¯ n,j),(¯ n,j
0)) = 0 holds for all (¯ n,j),(¯ n,j
0) ∈ b
∗. (10)
Thus by the assumptions V (¯ n) = 0 holds and thus V (n)=0h o l d sf o ra l ln ≤ ¯ n. This implies
that the reservation price of agents with ¯ np is ¯ np. Indeed, u = u+ V (¯ n− q) >V(¯ n)=0f o r
any positive integer q ≤ ¯ n.
Let ˜ n =¯ n +m a x {o | (o, ¯ n) ∈ b∗}. Note that by b∗ ∈ B∗ there exists (o, ¯ n) ∈ b∗ satisfying
o 6= NT. We consider the following strategy:
1. ω(n)={1} for n =¯ n,... , ˜ n − 1a n dω(n)= N To t h e r w i s e ;
2. ρ(n)=n for all n.
The payoﬀ of this strategy at ¯ n is at least equal to uα(˜ n−1)−¯ n − c
P(˜ n−1)−¯ n−1
i=0 αi > 0. This
contradicts V (¯ n)=0 .
As in Matsui and Shimizu (2001), if there exists inﬁnitesimally small cost on holding
money, the following condition holds.
Assumption 6 For all b ∈ B∗, h(0) = 0 does not hold in any stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium xb.
For b ∈ B∗,l e tˆ βb
n and ˆ h be obtained by deleting the ﬁrst element of βb
n and h, respectively.
Let ˆ βb =(ˆ βb
0, ˆ βb
1,...,ˆ βb





nj and h(0) = 1 −
PN
n=1 ˆ h(n), let
ˆ Db







ˆ h(j) − ²1ˆ h(1),
ˆ Db
n(ˆ h, ˆ βb;γ,²)=Ob
n(h,βb;γ) − Ib
n(h,βb;γ)+²nˆ h(n) − ²n+1ˆ h(n +1 ) ,n =1 ,2,...,N− 1,
ˆ Db








Remark 2 The above ²-perturbation corresponds to the reallocation of assets in such a way
that agents with n 6= 0 give one unit to agents with n0 6= N. More precisely, the proportion
²nh(n)o fa g e n t sw i t hn give 1
N units to each agent with n0 =0 ,1,...,N − 1. Then the









ˆ h(j) − I
b
0(h,β









ˆ h(j) − I
b
n(h,β




















Thus they coincide with ˆ Db
n(ˆ h, ˆ βb;γ,²),n=0 ,1,...,N−1,N.N o t et h a t
PN
n=0 ˆ Db
n(ˆ h, ˆ βb;γ,²)=
0a n d
PN
n=0 n ˆ Db
n(ˆ h, ˆ βb;γ,²)=0h o l d .
Let










Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 4 and 6, for small enough ²>0, κ(ˆ h, ˆ βb,²) = 0 implies
h(0) > 0a n dˆ h(n) > 0f o ra l ln ≥ 1, unless h(0) = 1.
Proof:
If ˆ h(n)=0f o rs o m en ≥ 2, then Ob
n(h,βb;γ) = 0 holds and together with κn(ˆ h, ˆ βb,²)=0i t
follows that ˆ h(n+1) = 0. By induction, ˆ h(N) = 0 holds. On the other hand, when ˆ h(N)=0
it follows from κN(ˆ h, ˆ βb,²)=0t h a tˆ h(j)=0 ,j =1 ,2,...,N.T h u s h(0) = 1 holds. For
the case of ˆ h(1) = 0, since
PN
n=0 ˆ Db
n(ˆ h, ˆ βb;γ,²)=0a n d
PN
n=0 n ˆ Db
n(ˆ h, ˆ βb;γ,²) = 0, a similar
argument applies. Note that h(0) = 0 cannot be a solution for small enough ².
















κ(ˆ h, ˆ βb,²)
(V (n) − W b
nj(ˆ xb;γ)+σnj)(n,j)∈b


















The following lemma directly follows from Sard theorem.
Lemma 4 Let b ∈ B∗ be given. D(V,ˆ βb)ϕb is of full rank at almost every σ. Moreover, the
number of solutions to ϕb(V, ˆ βb,σ)=0f o rs u c hσ is ﬁnite.
Let the set of solutions for some given σ be (V i, ˆ βbi),i=1 ,...,`. The Jacobian matrix of








where ° represents some nonzero matrix and I is the identity matrix.
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumptions 4 and 6 hold. Let b ∈ B∗ be given. Then, if h(0) < 1,
Dˆ xbfb(·,²,σ) is of full rank for almost every (²,σ), where ²>0 is small enough, i.e., fb(·,²,σ)
is transversal to C(b,N), C(b,N)(n,j),a n dC(b,N)(n,j)(n0,j0) for all (n,j),(n0,j0) / ∈ b for almost every
(²,σ), where ²>0 is small enough.
Proof:








0 ˆ h(2) −ˆ h(3) 0 ··· 0




. . . ... . . .
0000 ··· −ˆ h(N − 1)
0000 ··· ˆ h(N − 1)
− 1
N
ˆ h(1) − 1
N
ˆ h(2) − 1
N
ˆ h(3) − 1
N
ˆ h(4) ··· − 1
N














ˆ h(n). Thus, by Lemma 3, the
a b o v em a t r i xi so ff u l lr a n ki fh(0) < 1a n d²>0 is small enough. Since the lower part of
Dfb has I, Dfb is of full rank.
23Lemma 6 Let b ∈ B∗ be given. Then, if h(0) = 1, Dˆ xbfb(·,²,σ) is of full rank and thus
fb(·,²,σ) is transversal to C(b,N), C(b,N)(n,j),a n dC(b,N)(n,j)(n0,j0) for all (n,j),(n0,j0) / ∈ b for
almost every (²,σ).
Proof:














0 ε2 −ε3 0 ··· 0




















where ˜ h =( ˆ h(1),ˆ h(2),...,ˆ h(N − 1)). Let the ﬁrst matrix evaluated at (V i, ˆ βbi)b ed e n o t e d
by Ai and the second matrix, a function of ²,b yd e n o t e db yE(²).





for ²>0. Next, let
F
i(²)=d e t ( A
i + E(²)).











Since det(·) is a continuous function and detE(²∗) 6= 0, then, for small enough χ,d e t ( χAi +
E(²∗)) 6= 0. Thus it follows that F i( 1
χ²∗) 6=0 .S i n c eF i(²) is an analytic function (polyno-
mial), then either (i) {² | F i(²)=0 } is a set of measure zero or (ii) F i(²) = 0 for all ².B y
F i( 1
χ²∗) 6= 0, (i) holds.
Thus the above matrix is of full rank at h(0) = 1 for almost every ². Since the lower part
of Dfb has I,t h e nDfb is of full rank at h(0) = 1 for almost every ².
By the above lemmata, fb(·,²,σ) is transversal to these sets for almost every (²,σ), where
²>0 is small enough.
To sum up, for given b ∈ B∗, for almost every (²,σ), with ²>0 small enough, fb is
transversal to C(b,N), C(b,N)(n,j),a n dC(b,N)(n,j)(n0,j0) for all (n,j),(n0,j0) / ∈ b and D(V,ˆ β)ϕb is
of full rank. Applying the same argument for any b ∈ B∗, the above holds for all b ∈ B∗ and
almost every (²,σ), where ² is small enough. Thus, for almost every (²,σ)w i t h²>0s m a l l
enough, the approximated solution path is a one-dimensional manifold such that
1. h(n) > 0,n=0 ,1,...,N,u n l e s sh(0) = 1;
242. the solution path transversely intersects the boundary at h(0) = 1.
Thus the set of approximated equilibria can be generated by ﬁnding an endpoint at h(0) = 1
and following the one-dimensional manifold by some simplicial or predictor-corrector algo-
rithm, see, for example, Allgower and Georg (1990). Moreover, by Assumption 5, a nonmon-
etary equilibrium cannot be an endpoint of the path if σnj > 0f o ra l l( n,j).
Remark 3 It might happen that, at h(0) = 1, some indiﬀerence condition becomes an
identity in the original system. For example, in the sixth piece of the example in Subsection
3.3, agents with 0 oﬀer p or 2p and thus
(1 − h(0))(−c + αV (1)) + h(0)V (0) = h(2)(−c + V (2)) + (1 − h(2))V (0)
holds. At h(0) = 1, the above equation becomes V (0) = V (0), an identity. If we add
constant terms on both sides of the equation, there is generically no solution. Thus the
approximation might be bad around h(0) = 1. In order to overcome this diﬃculty, we may
















κ(ˆ h, ˆ βb,²)

















n0k + σnj)(n,j)/ ∈b

.
The latter system typically does not contain an identity, not even at h(0) = 1.
5.2 Zhou’s Model Revisited
In this subsection, we investigate the case of N =2 ,k =3 ,u = 15
4 ,c= 3
4,a n dα = 3
4.A s
illustrated in Subsection 3.3, the set of equilibria contains a two-dimensional piece. However,
by using the perturbation above, the set of approximated equilibria becomes one-dimensional.
We use the following perturbed system:
²1 = ²2 =1× 10
−5,σ0NT =4 .8 × 10
−5,σ01 =5 .1 × 10
−5,σ02 =4 .3 × 10
−5,
σ1NT =4 .9 × 10
−5,σ11 =4 .3 × 10
−5,σ2NT =4 .6 × 10
−5,
where σnj is the constant term for oﬀering jp or NT at state n. Since in the original system
the incentive constraints for the reservation prices never beco m eb i n d i n g ,w ed on o tn e e dt o
25perturb these. As in Remark 3, the approximation is not very good around the endpoint of
the sixth piece. In fact, there should exist another short piece adjacent to the sixth piece.
However, we could not numerically identify it because the perturbation is too small.
Below, we present the (ﬁrst) six approximated pieces corresponding to the pieces in the
original system; the strategies of each piece are the same as those of the corresponding piece.
(See Figure 3.) Note that the approximation is close except around the end of the sixth
piece.
The ﬁrst piece:
• the starting point: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (1,0,0).
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.62351,0.26438,0.11211).
• at the endpoint, agents with 1 become indiﬀerent between oﬀering p and NT.
The second piece:
• the starting point: the endpoint of the ﬁrst piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.84299,0.15699,5 × 10−5).
• at the endpoint, the proportion of agents with 1 oﬀering p becomes 0.
The third piece:
• the starting point: the endpoint of the second piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.25001,0.74999,4.9997 × 10−5).
• at the endpoint, agents with 0 become indiﬀerent between oﬀering p,2 p,a n dN T .
The forth piece:
• the starting point: the endpoint of the third piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.58347,0.41645,8.3252 × 10−5).
• at the endpoint, agents with 1 become indiﬀerent between oﬀering p and NT.
26The ﬁfth piece:
• the starting point: the endpoint of the forth piece.
• the endpoint: (h(0),h(1),h(2)) = (0.61067,0.23378,0.15555).
• at the endpoint, the proportion of agents with 1 choosing NT becomes 0.
The sixth piece:
• the strategies: agents with 0 oﬀer p or 2p,a g e n t sw i t h1o ﬀer p and their reservation
price is p, and the reservation price of agents with 2 is 2p.
• the starting point: the endpoint of the ﬁfth piece.
• the endpoint: it is numerically hard to ﬁnd the endpoint around h(0) = 1.
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